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work as a suitable foundat ion for a feminist ethical theory. 
T h i s is not the place to debate the merits of metaphysical 
positions, but there is one feature of Spinoza's w h i c h 
makes it part icular ly problematic i n this context, and this 
is of course the determinism. Spinoza himself says that 
" g o o d " and " b a d " are only terms that reflect the pleasure 
and the p a i n of the h u m a n organism i n m o v i n g towards 
or away f rom self-actualization, and that there are no 
moral values separate from that. T h e subjectivism inher-
ent i n that c l a i m bothers me less than the problems 
involved i n creating any sort of ethical theory on a deter-
minis t ic base. N o t only a m I not attracted by a determinis-
tic metaphysics, but I regard it as a bad foundation for a 
comprehensive ethics. T h u s , on a very general level, I 
again feel some reluctance to adopt Spinoza as a source of 
ethics. 
A l l that said, it is true that feminists may wel l f i n d 
Spinoza a more sympathetic figure than others i n the 
history of phi losophy. For one thing, as T o m m points 
out, there do not appear to be any systemic reasons why he 
w o u l d have to d is t inguish between the sexes i n terms of 
rat ional or moral capacity. There is a greater sense of the 
interrelation and mutua l dependence of people than one 
finds i n , say, Locke or Aristotle. T h u s an ethic based o n 
Spinoza w o u l d not involve the competitive not ion of 
moral i ty that so many of us f i n d objectionable. We do not 
necessarily f i n d the sort of hyperrationality of a Kant, 
where it does not matter what people want or whether they 
w i l l be happy when one formulates a m o r a l pr inc ip le , so 
l o n g as no logical inconsistency results f rom one's w i l l i n g 
of that pr inc ip le . It is the case that for Spinoza, emot ion 
does play a role i n ethical behaviour, a l though I do not 
th ink it is as extensive as T o m m does. F i n a l l y , the whole 
not ion of morali ty i n the Ethics as being concerned w i t h 
h o w we should lead our lives as a whole, and not just w i t h 
a narrow part of our lives governed by some externally 
imposed set of rules, is sympathetic, and is one point at 
least on w h i c h I have always agreed w i t h Spinoza. H o w -
ever, i n the end, I s t i l l f i n d too m u c h emphasis o n the 
logica l nature of reality i n Spinoza to be able seriously to 
accept h i m as more than a m i n o r inspirat ion for feminist 
ethics. 
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No More 
Sylvia Anne why? 
Y o u are more than analyst's files or 
th in lines of i l l-used blood 
left to rot onto icy tiles 
printed like graffiti w h i c h cries 
a l l the whi le " L ive , l ive , " 
Y o u both wailed those words 
into empty stoves locked bathrooms 
asylums for incurables. 
Y o u r breath o n the mirrors spews out 
hospital white yet clean like the gowns 
you wear i n city cabs to sterile churches 
praying a l l the way " L ive , l i v e , " 
V i r g i n i a , you've walked into that river 
too often w i t h useless tones i n your pocket. 
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